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DLD-073

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3980
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
CRAIG BROWN,
a/k/a BEY,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 97-cr-00544-001)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and the
Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability
December 22, 2011
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2012)
_________________
OPINION
_________________

PER CURIAM
Craig Brown appeals from the District Court’s orders declining to reconsider its
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denial of his motion for a modification of his sentence. For the following reasons, we
will summarily affirm.
I.
In 1998, Brown was found guilty by a jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
of possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. He was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. This Court affirmed
his judgment of sentence.
In June 2009, Brown filed a “motion for adjustment modification of an imposed
term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 3582(c), (1), (B) predicated upon another
modifying statute 28 U.S.C. [§] 2255.” He claimed that he was (1) wrongly sentenced as
a career offender because the predicate convictions upon which his career offender status
was based were improperly designated as crimes of violence, see Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137 (2008); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009); (2) denied
due process as a result of his improper sentencing; and (3) actually innocent of being a
career offender. The District Court treated the motion as a § 2255 motion and denied it
as untimely.
Brown filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that the District Court
erred in construing his motion as a § 2255 motion instead of a § 3582 motion. He was
subsequently appointed counsel, who filed a second motion for reconsideration. Counsel
appeared to agree with the District Court’s characterization of the motion as a § 2255
motion, but argued that the motion was, in fact, timely and that, alternatively, relief was
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available to Brown pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The District Court denied both
motions for reconsideration. Brown timely appealed.
II.
“When a § 3582 motion requests the type of relief that § 3582 provides for – that
is, when the motion argues that sentencing guidelines have been modified to change the
applicable guidelines used in the defendant’s sentencing – then the motion is rightly
construed as a motion to amend sentencing pursuant to § 3582.” United States v. Carter,
500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007). However, “when a motion titled as a § 3582 motion
otherwise attacks the petitioner’s underlying conviction or sentence, that is an attack on
the merits of the case and should be construed as a § 2255 motion.” Id.; Okereke v.
United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or
sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution.”).
The District Court properly viewed Brown’s motion as having been brought
pursuant to § 2255 because the motion attacks his sentence based on an alleged
constitutional violation and/or a fundamental miscarriage of justice that occurred during
his sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Indeed, Brown’s own filings confirm that he is
seeking relief under § 2255 as the “modifying statue” that would permit the court to
reduce his sentence.1 Furthermore, Brown’s contentions that he was inappropriately

1

Brown’s argument to the contrary is based on § 3582(c)(1)(B), which states that, despite
§ 3582(c)’s general prohibition against modification of a term of imprisonment, a court is
3

sentenced as a career offender and that his sentence violates the constitution do not
provide a basis for relief under § 3582(c).
Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241. A prisoner may
proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per
curiam). We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances,
such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was
convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no
allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but
instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307
F.3d at 120-21 (holding that Dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via
§ 2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law).

entitled to modify a sentence when “otherwise expressly permitted by statute.” That
§ 2255 is among the statutes expressly permitting modification of a sentence does not
permit Brown to circumvent the requirements applicable to § 2255 motions by
referencing the provision through § 3582. Furthermore, although district courts are
generally required to provide notice to a pro se litigant before re-characterizing a motion
as a § 2255 motion, see United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1999), it is
difficult to say that the District Court engaged in any re-characterization here given
Brown’s express reliance on § 2255. Regardless, the District Court did not err in failing
provide notice because the § 2255 motion was untimely, as discussed further below. See
United States v. Chew, 284 F.3d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 2002) (no Miller warning was required
where the statute of limitations already barred petitioner from filing a § 2255 motion at
the time of re-characterization).
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Brown must obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal the District Court’s
denial of his § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). We decline to grant him one
because reasonable jurists would agree that the District Court correctly dismissed his
motion as time-barred. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). A one-year
statute of limitations applies to § 2255 motions and begins to run on the latest of four
possible dates, the most common being the date on which the movant’s judgment of
conviction became final. § 2255(f)(1). As Brown’s § 2255 motion was filed
approximately ten years after his judgment of conviction became final, it is clearly
untimely under that approach. Furthermore, none of § 2255(f)’s alternative start dates
applies nor is there any apparent basis for equitable tolling.
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to issue a certificate of appealability with
respect to the District Court’s denial of Brown’s § 2255 motion and summarily affirm the
remaining aspects of the District Court’s rulings. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P.
10.6.
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